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STUDENT NOTE 
How Puppet Masters Create Genocide: A Study in the State-
Sponsored Killings in Rwanda and Cambodia 
Joel H. Feigenbaumȗ 
ABSTRACT 
This paper calls on the United States to assess where its true interests lie in evaluating genocide and 
mass killings. Through an examination of the social and political factors which were paramount in bringing 
about the atrocities in Cambodia in the late 1970s and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, the U.S. is urged to take 
heed of the tried-and-true methods used by ruthless regimes throughout history in bringing about the 
destruction of their own citizenry. Consideration of the psychological imperatives necessary for ordinary 
men or women to depart from the standard boundaries of civilized society and butcher their neighbors and 
countrymen is worthwhile in understanding how individuals permit, if not facilitate, genocide in their own 
backyards. 
Many believe that genocides are inevitable and caused by ancient ethnic or religious strife. 
Governments understand these tensions and use them to exploit their own people and gain political 
leverage. Genocide does not occur over night. Bringing about the conditions necessary to permit such a 
grave injustice is cultivated over many years, often decades. When governments enact laws and issue 
directives, no matter the content, the legitimacy of such edicts cannot be overlooked by the average 
citizen, especially the ill-educated and impoverished. By looking at the legislation and government 
programs enacted prior to mass-murder, clear and systematic evidence of intent cannot be overlooked. 
The goal of this article is to spread awareness of the methods and techniques employed leading up to 
genocide so that the freedom-loving nations of the world may act proactively and prevent tragedies 
before needless blood is spilled. 
                                                 
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 2013; B.A. History, University of Richmond, 2010. Executive Managing Editor of 
the University of Miami National Security and Armed Conflict Law Review. Edited by Alexander J. Roth. 
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Only 16 of the world’s 193 countries currently remain untouched by war.1 At any given time, an 
average of 50 nations are engaged in armed conflict.2 Prolific writer and professor emeritus at the University 
of Hawaii, Rudolph Rummel, estimates that in the twentieth-century about forty million people were killed 
in wars, but 140 million noncombatants died.3 Civilians comprise well over half of this latter figure, not 
killed accidentally, but deliberately.4 By starvation, overwork, “outright slaughter” in concentration camps 
and prison, and as helpless refugees fleeing persecution or cowering in their homes, killing in such 
astronomical numbers requires a great deal of organization and a “gross asymmetry of power in favor of the 
perpetrators.”5 
What is it that drives an ordinary person to commit the most heinous acts imaginable against their 
neighbors? What precisely breaks the moral fiber of an individual and leads them to participate in an 
organized campaign of mass murder? When looking specifically to the genocides in Cambodia and 
Rwanda, one gains an understanding of how governments can manipulate the morality and culture as 
well as the legal and social systems which govern a society, thus creating an ideal set of circumstances 
for a bloodbath. In both Cambodia and Rwanda, state-sponsored killings were the result of a methodical 
and carefully contrived political and social agenda, which effectively, over time, garnered them the 
support of their citizenry. 
In both circumstances, the top-down, contrived scheme, designed by puppet masters in government 
offices, was paramount in annihilating a segment of the population. A keen understanding of the social, 
ideological, and demographically oriented history of the region and its inhabitants set the stage for the 
events which unraveled on the ground. The Communist Khmer Rouge (“Khmer”) regime in Cambodia 
and the elected Hutu in Rwanda each utilized different strategies in securing the confidence of their 
citizenry. In a military coup, the Khmer established Democratic Kampuchea (“DK”) in today’s 
Cambodia and under a new constitution, ruled from 1975-1979. The DK was recognized by the United 
Nations and a majority of the international community, including the United States, as the legitimate 
representative of the Cambodian people.6 
Following the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana, the Rwandan Armed Forces (“RAF”) 
took control of the government with the Hutu Presidential Guard at the helm. This force had a loose control 
of Rwanda for roughly 100 days, in which no legislation or “official” directives were given. Both 
governments relied heavily on tactics including propaganda and preying on mortal fears, as well as the 
desire to achieve upward mobility and elevating designed segments of the population. 
Through an examination of the critical political and social conditions made possible by authorities 
in these two nations, one can put together two coherent and complimentary blueprints of how genocides 
commence. It is this article’s aim to bring attention to these models and suggest that the United States 
not only consider them, but prioritize them in evaluating future humanitarian crises. No longer can the 
                                                 
1 STEVE K. BAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: PERPETRATORS, BYSTANDARDS, AND RESCUERS 9 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
2 Id. citing C.P. SCHERRER, STRUCTURAL PREVENTION OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
3 DANIEL CHIROT & CLARK MCCAULEY, WHY NOT KILL THEM ALL? THE LOGIC AND PREVENTION OF MASS POLITICAL 
MURDER 57 (Princeton University Press, 2006); But see PIERRE HASSNER, FROM WAR AND PEACE TO VIOLENCE AND 
INTERVENTION: PERMANENT MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, in HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 17 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998) (suggesting that about 150 million people have been killed in 
cold blood by their own governments, compared to the 35 million who were killed in all of the twentieth-century wars, 
including both world wars and all civil wars). 
4 CHIROT & MCCAULEY, supra note 3, at 58. 
5 Id. at 57. 
6 Linda L. Schlueter, The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, MOD. L. SYS. CYCLOPEDIA, vol. 9, 2002, at 9.1610.19, 
available at HeinOnline 9 Mod. Legal Sys. Cyclopedia 9.160.19. 
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U.S. sit idly by and watch innocent men and women be slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands, while 
it knowingly prioritizes domestic concerns and political capital over innocent lives. 
The article will begin with an introduction to the dissonance theory and mob mentality— 
psychological principles that help explain the phenomena of mass-killing performed by ordinary men 
and women from the general populace. Common dissonance techniques will then be discussed as they 
relate to the Cambodian genocide. An analytical inspection of the nation’s Communist constitution will 
assist the reader in understanding the governmental initiatives which led to the “Killing Fields.” By 
looking at the Rwandan genocide next, one gains a greater appreciation for the similar methods 
employed by ruthless regimes to bring about the destruction of a distinct population. The role of 
identification cards by the Hutu government will be highlighted. The article will then discuss the United 
States’ understanding of these two atrocities and its role in handling the humanitarian crisis. Lastly, 
there is a call for the U.S. to take a more proactive approach to genocide prevention and prioritize the 
value of human life above what are considered less consequential concerns. 
II. HOW KILLING BECOMES EASY 
A. MOB-MENTALITY 
In his 1895 book, La Psychologie Des Foules (“The Psychology of Crowds”), French sociologist and 
journalist Gustav Le Bon stated, “A man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization . . . by the mere 
fact he forms part of an organized crowd. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual: in a crowd, he is a 
barbarian – this is, a creature acting by instinct.”7 Austrian neurologist and philosopher Sigmund Freud 
agreed with Le Bon, believing that crowds were excitable, impulsive, suggestive[,] and lacked self-
criticism.8 Freud argued that people in groups: 1) exhibit a loss of individual personality; 2) focus their 
thoughts and feelings into the common direction; 3) see a surge in the unconscious power of emotion of 
reason and judgment; and 4) are compelled to immediately carry out their intentions.9 
Violence in the group becomes possible because individuals, who have lost their conscience and 
values, now look to the group leader as their moral compass.10 Although the individuals in the group may be 
good and moral, groups are inherently selfish and uncaring.11 The American Founding Fathers were quite 
wary of mob mentality. In conceiving their new government, they feared that the “mob” might overtake 
Congress and cripple the young nation. Under the pseudonym Publius, James Madison shared his concerns 
to the people of New York in The Federalist No. 55. He said, “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever 
character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a 
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”12 
M. Scott Peck, an American psychiatrist and best-selling author suggests, “Any group will remain 
inevitably[,] potentially conscienceless[,] and evil until such a time as each and every individual holds 
                                                 
7 JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLINGS 34-36 (Oxford University 
Press, 2d ed. 2007) citing GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 12 (Norman S. Berg ed., 1968) 
(describing group immaturity, or the notion that human groups behave at a level that is more primitive and immature than one 
might expect). 
8 WALLER, supra note 7, at 34. 
9 Id.; Ravi Bhavanani, Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the Rwanda Genocide, 43 
J. PEACE RES. 6, 653 (2006). 
10 WALLER, supra note 7, at 35; BAUM, supra note 1, at 199 (according to historian Ben Valentino, the number of perpetrators in 
the average population ranges between 2 and 15 percent). 
11 Reinhold Niebuhr of the Union Theological Seminary in New York City believed that all collectives are more arrogant, 
hypocritical, self-centered, and ruthless in the pursuit of their ends than the individual. WALLER, supra note 7, at 35 citing 
REINHOLD NIEBBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS ix (Charles Scribner’s Sons 
ed., 1932). 
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison). 
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himself or herself directly responsible for the behavior of the whole group— the organism— of which he or 
she is a part.”13 Falling back on group absolution, Lt. Col. David Grossman, who coined the term “killology” 
while a professor of military science at Arkansas State University, argues that individuals believe the group 
is a killer, not themselves personally.14 By diffusing responsibility, individuals in a group commit acts they 
would never dream of doing alone.15 Over time, group goals overshadow and become indistinguishable from 
personal ones. 
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO DISSONANCE 
It is relatively easy to get soldiers to fight and kill others in battle who are clearly intent on killing them 
first. The “dissonance theory” helps to explain the psychology necessary to overcome the natural reluctance 
to kill those that pose little to no threat.16 Dissonance can be described as “an unpleasant arousal that comes 
from seeing ourselves as having chosen to do something wrong, stupid, or sleazy— that is something at odds 
with our positive self-image.”17 To eliminate these feelings, it is necessary to change ones beliefs about what 
is right and wrong. Dissonance commonly takes form in: 1) dehumanizing victims; 2) employing 
euphemisms to mask deeds; 3) moral restructuring and justification; and 4) becoming acclimated to killing 
and denying responsibility for individual actions.18 These methods of dissonance have commonly been 
employed by genocidal regimes, and were seen in both Cambodia and Rwanda. 
C. COMMON FORMS OF DISSONANCE IN GENOCIDE 
i. Dehumanization 
Psychologist Erik Erikson advocates that through pseudospeciation, killers dehumanize their victims. 
He explains, “People lose the sense of being one species and try to make other people into a different and 
mortally dangerous species, one that doesn’t count, one that isn't human . . . You can kill them without feeling 
that you have killed your own kind.”19 In many cases of genocide, victims are categorized as animals—
subhuman—or as demons and monsters—inhuman.20 Dehumanization is most prevalent where a group can be 
easily identified as belonging to a distinct racial, ethnic, religious, social or political group that the killers 
regard as inferior.21 Perpetrators first deprive victims of their individual identity by defining them by their 
“category.”22 They then exclude those of the “category” from all others in the community, thereby laying the 
groundwork in separating this smaller community from the morals governing community as a whole.23 
                                                 
13 WALLER, supra note 7, at 37 citing M. SCOTT PECK, PEOPLE OF THE LIE: THE HOPE FOR HEALING HUMAN EVIL, 218 (Simon 
and Schuster ed., 1983). 
14 CHIROT & MCCAULEY, supra note 3, at 57 (saying “Membership in a group of killers creates powerful bonds of solidarity that 
can legitimize killing and reduce any dissonance felt by those who murder.” Cohesion in a group that is assigned a horrid task 
makes it difficult for an individual to shirk their responsibilities for they know their load will be shifted onto their cohorts); 
WALLER, supra note 7, at 37. 
15 WALLER, supra note 7, at 37. 
16 CHIROT & MCCAULEY, supra note 3, at 54. 
17 Id.; W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massie Violations of Human Rights, 973 YALE FACULTY 
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 78 (1996); See also Daniel M. Greenfield, The Crime of Complicity in Genocide: How the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia Got it Wrong, and Why it Matters, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 931. 
18 Alexander Laban Hinton, Agents of Death: Explaining the Cambodian Genocide in Terms of Psychological Dissonance, 98 
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 4, 824 (1996); WALLER, supra note 7, at 202. 
19 WALLER, supra note 7, at 206 citing Elizabeth Hall, A Conversation with Erik Erikson, PSYCHOL. TODAY 30 (1983). 
20 WALLER, supra note 7, at 206-208 (saying that in World War II, the Japanese would perform medical experiments on human 
prisoners, calling them maruta—logs of wood. Similarly, the Nazis referred to the Jews as “parasites,” “vermin,” and 
“excrement.” When counting the corpses of those gassed to death in the concentration camps, Gestapo officials denoted the 
numbers as “merchandise” and “pieces,” as opposed slaughtered human beings). 
21 Id. at 207. 
22 Anthony Oberschall, Preventing Genocide, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 1, 2 (2000); WALLER, supra note 7, at 207. 
23 WALLER, supra note 7, at 207. 
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ii. Euphemisms 
By camouflaging evil in “innocuous or sanitizing jargon, the evil loses much of its moral repugnancy . . 
. language can obscure, mystify or otherwise redefine acts of evil.”24 Through euphemism, bombing runs are 
surgical strikes, killed innocents are collateral damage, and enemies are “wasted” or “liquidated,” not 
killed.25 Mass murder becomes “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, “bush clearing” in Rwanda, and “cleansing 
diseased elements” in Cambodia.26 In Nazi Germany, Jews were referred to by medical vocabulary and their 
extermination was characterized as a calculated public health decision.27 While simply calling murder by 
another name does not completely remove the connotation to the average perpetrator, it does however lead 
to “dissociation, disavowal, and emotional distance.”28 
iii. Moral Justification 
People are normally unable to engage in extraordinarily evil acts without justification; the necessity to 
kill is often rationalized in terms of one’s own personal safety and security—self-defense.29 Genocide and 
mass killings “are made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or 
moral purposes.”30 
iv. Acclimation to Killing and the Denial of Personal Responsibility 
Denial and becoming acclimated to killing, or to evil, is often critical for the perpetrators of genocide.31 
As Elie Wiessel, Holocaust survivor and Nobel Laureate, conveys in Night, humans tend toward denial 
because reality is too inconvenient to deal with.32 
III. THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE 
People often used to characterize Cambodia as a “gentle land” inhabited by nonviolent Buddhists 
who were always courteous, friendly, and ready with a smile. Beginning in the late 1960s, 
however, the country was rocked by socioeconomic unrest, civil war, intense U.S. bombings, and, 
finally, social revolution. While 600,000 of Cambodia’s 8 million inhabitants perished during 
these years, up to a million and a half people later died from disease, starvation, overwork, and 
execution during the Democratic Kampuchea (1975-79). Survivor accounts are replete with 
stories of how the Khmer Rouge shot, bludgeoned, stabbed and tortured legions of their own 
country’s people. This type of violence demands the attention of scholars.33 
The social and political landscapes that developed in Cambodia resulted from a series of key 
campaigns designed to alter citizen ideology. The most fundamental need of the Communists upon taking 
                                                 
24 Id. at 211. 
25 Bhavnani, supra note 9, at 666; WALLER, supra note 7, at 211. 
26 WALLER, supra note 7, at 211. 
27 Hinton, supra note 18, at 825 (stating that in being prepared for “special treatment” at Auschwitz, Jews appeared before 
“disinfection squads” that poured cyanide into their “shower” rooms). 
28 WALLER, supra note 7, at 212 (suggesting that by using euphemisms, “perpetrators are able to mask the true mature of their 
actions with expressions that make them seem benign or even respectable”). 
29 Id. at 202. 
30 Id. at 203; Oberschall, supra note 22, at 10. 
31 See generally ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT (Bantam Books, 1982). 
32 See generally WIESEL, supra note 31; Gregory H. Stanton, The 12 Ways to Deny Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH (Sept. 13, 
2004), http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/12waystodenygenocide.html. 
33 Hinton, supra note 18, at 818; ROBERT G. SUTTER, THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS & U.S. POLICY DILEMMAS 14 (Westview Press ed., 
1991) (saying that scholars estimate the dead range from one and a half to three million). 
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power was to challenge and change the political hierarchy of the nation.34 Through advancing the power of 
rural peasants and eliminating the opposition threats that existed in the wealthy, educated, urban, and 
political realms, the Khmer Rouge turned Cambodia upside down. Kaylanee Mam, a Yale University 
professor, writes, “When the KR [Khmer Rouge] came to power in 1975, their aim was to achieve a 
communist revolution that would place state power in the hands of the work-peasant . . . and radically 
transform the Cambodian social order.”35 
A. THE URBAN EVACUATION 
After seizing power on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge immediately began a brutal evacuation of the 
two million citizens living in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals.36 Thousands 
died of exhaustion, starvation, and execution in this evacuation and the others that followed in cities across 
the country.37 Most treks lasted from two weeks to four months, however longer voyages were not 
uncommon.38 Meas Sokhom, who was forced to evacuate from Phnom Penh to Takeo, walked for six 
months before reaching her destination.39 
Dispersing the urban population was a design to: 1) control the citizenry; 2) level class distinctions; 3) 
create a strong labor base for the new agrarian, communist society; and 4) weed out opposition.40 The “forced 
rustification,” as it was called, witnessed the closure of hospitals, schools, factories and monasteries.41 Money, 
wages, and personal property were abolished, and libraries destroyed.42 A campaign to identify potential traitors, 
such as teachers, students, bureaucrats, technical workers, and professionals was undertaken.43 Most of these 
“class enemies” were killed while others were sent to be “re-educated” at special camps or farms.44 
In relocating the urban population to the countryside, these outcasts automatically became a disadvantaged 
class of people who, upon arriving in rural settings, were seen as “new.”45 The youngest and poorest individuals 
were chosen as local leaders because they were believed to be the most malleable and could be easily convinced 
of the “class enemy.”46 By exploiting social cleavages that existed between the rural and city dwelling 
populations, the Communists made a key strategic gain.47 By putting those that had previously enjoyed the least 
power and influence in positions of authority, the Khmer appointed those who most likely harbored the strongest 
ill will toward the previous elites and were most willing to exercise their newfound rights.48 
                                                 
34 WILLIAM SHOWCROSS, LESSONS OF CAMBODIA, in THE NEW KILLING FIELDS: MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION, 
at 39 (Nicolaus Mills & Kira Brunner eds., 2002). 
35 KAYLANEE MAM, THE ENDURANCE OF THE CAMBODIAN FAMILY UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME: AN ORAL HISTORY in 
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW PERSPECTIVES, at 119 (Susan E. Cook ed. 2006). 
36 Id. (stating that Khmer Rouge solders soon forced all families, urban and rural alike to abandon their homes for relocation. 
Soldiers were told to bring as little as possible with them, only a little food. They said that Angkar (Angkar is Khmer for the 
“organization”) would bring them everything they needed); see also Hinton, supra note 18, at 823 citing ELIZABETH BECKER, 
WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE VOICES OF CAMBODIA’S REVOLUTION AND ITS PEOPLE (Touchstone ed., 1986); WALLER, 
supra note 7, at 163. 
37 WALLER, supra note 7, at 163; SUTTER, supra note 33, at 13-14; MAM, supra note 35, at 121-22 (saying that in Phnom Penh, 
the trek death rate was approximately 0.53 percent or a total of 10,600 out of two million evacuees). 
38 MAM, supra note 35, at 121. 
39 Id. 
40 Hinton, supra note 18, at 823. 
41 WALLER, supra note 7, at 164. 
42 Id.; MAM, supra note 35, at 131, 133-34. 
43 Hinton, supra note 18, at 823. 
44 Id. (saying that eradicating any potential sources of opposition, the Khmer Rouge instituted several social and ideological 
reforms that created an environment in which genocide could prosper); MAM, supra note 35, at 121 (suggesting that 93 percent 
of those interviewed confirmed that their families were deported to another place, while an additional 33 percent said that they 
were separated from their families while evacuating). 
45 Hinton, supra note 18, at 825. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.; MAM, supra note 35, at 140. 
48 Hinton, supra note 18, at 825. 
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B. THE CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 
On January 3, 1976 the Council of Ministers approved the constitution by which their new government 
would be run.49 It came into effect two days later on January 5th when Hu Nim, Cambodian Minister for 
Information and Propaganda, read the document over the radio.50 A special National Congress had met in 
April 1975, soon after the coup, and was empowered to draft a constitution.51 The constitution was not 
drafted by scholars or intellectuals, nor was it the product of painstaking research and consultation of foreign 
documents; the people— workers, peasants, and soldiers created this document so that it would be easy to 
understand and recall.52 
The Kampuchean Constitution proclaimed that Cambodia was a “State of the people, workers, 
peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers [sic].”53 Conspicuously missing from this list are 
students, artists, authors, and professional.54 Vast portions of the Cambodian populace were excluded 
from this list and left to wonder where they will fall in this new society.55 It is later promulgated that the 
legislature, the Kampuchean People’s Representative Assembly, would be filled with only workers 
peasants and laborers.56 This legislature was charged with appointing the nation’s president, vice 
presidents, and judiciary.57 
In a purposely vague and amorphous decree, Article X, Chapter III, states that any “dangerous 
activities in opposition to the people’s State must be condemned to the highest degree.”58 In failing to 
explain what would constitute treason, much less the punishment imposed for such a violation, the Khmer 
were provided the legitimacy and authority to carry out mass executions and re-education campaigns 
without worrying about constitutional safeguards against their abuse of power.59 The rights of Cambodians 
under this regime were few: 
Every citizen of Democratic Kampuchea is guaranteed a living. All workers are the masters of 
their factories. All peasants are the masters of their rice paddies and fields. All other labourers 
[sic] have the right to work. There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea.60 
The rights of a citizen were summed up in no more than five short sentences, which only 
guaranteed the (compulsory) right to work.61 There is no mention of home, family, inheritance, health, 
                                                 
49 Schlueter, supra note 6, at 9.160.19; Broadcast: Daily Report: Pacific and Far East, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (Jan. 5, 1976); SUTTER, supra note 33, at 14; David P. Chandler, The Constitution of 
Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Changes, 49 PAC. AFF. 3, 506 (1976). 
50 SUTTER, supra note 33, at 15. 
51 Chandler, supra note 49, at 506 (saying drafters included all cabinet members, 500 farmer’s representatives, 300 worker’s 
representatives, and 300 representatives of the Cambodian Revolutionary Army). 
52 Id.; See generally A.P. BLAUSTEIN & G.H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (1971). 
53 DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA CONSTITUTION (1975-1979), available at Cornel University Libraries, Ithaca, NY [hereinafter DK 
CONSTITUTION]. 
54 Chandler, supra note 49, at 511 (noting that the absence or abolition of patrons, landlords, money-lenders, merchants, and 
other white-collar workers is telling). 
55 DK CONSTITUTION, supra note 53 (saying, not coincidentally, these individuals would likely be the most equipped to 
challenge the new government); Chandler, supra note 49, at 508 (stating that the preamble divided society into “workers, poor 
farmers, middle farmers, lower-level farmers, and all other laborers”). 
56 DK CONSTITUTION, supra note 53; See also Cambodia: Thieves be Gone 258 ECONOMIST 6907, 40 (Jan. 10, 1976) 
[hereinafter Thieves] (saying neither the constitution nor any other statements has shed any light on how the legislature would 
be elected and the qualifications to run for a seat). 
57 DK CONSTITUTION, supra note 53 (saying that this 250 member body selected through general election was responsible for 
appointing every official in the country); Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 4, 950 (1999). 
58 DK CONSTITUTION, supra note 53. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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education, or rights before the law, which are common among most constitutions, even communist 
constitutions.62 Prominently, the overriding purpose of Cambodian life is said to be chivaphead 
(“livelihood”) instead of the more common word chivit (“life”).63 Noteworthy, all “reactionary 
religions” deemed detrimental to the nation and its people are absolutely forbidden64 and the use of 
guerrilla warfare is legitimized.65 
C. WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 
Cambodia was cut off from the world. Foreign and minority languages were banned, communication 
and travel between villages was eliminated and the Theravada Buddhist religion, to which ninety percent of 
the population belonged, was outlawed.66 By banning the practice of law, medicine, engineering, and 
science, farming became the national (unpaid) occupation.67 Founder of the Cambodian Genocide Program 
at Yale University, Ben Kiernan, estimates that 1.7 million people—nearly a quarter of the total 
population— were “worked, starved or beaten to death.”68 
A culture of harmony was further eroded by the execution of the country’s leading monks immediately 
after the revolution.69 The rest of the Buddhist leaders were removed from their posts.70 Temples were 
destroyed, religious texts burned, and artifacts desecrated.71 “If a Cambodian child had previously received 
her or his earliest lessons on mortality at the temple, she or he was now indoctrinated into an ideology that 
glorified revolutionary violence and blood sacrifice . . . communism replaced Buddhism as the new 
‘religion.’”72 
The vertical, hierarchical structure of Cambodian society—where people are differentiated in terms 
of power, status, and patronage—lays the groundwork for a cultural model of obedience to, and respect 
for, authority.73 The Khmer Rouge was able to tap into an existing cultural model that undermined the 
gentle ethic previously characterized through communal interactions.74 Families were previously the 
core unit of Cambodian life and therefore constituted a threat to the new regime.75 By stripping away the 
social and economic functions of the family, employed for generations, the Khmer Rouge destroyed the 
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basic societal unit, uprooting Cambodian life from its core.76 Families were separated by housing 
restrictions, relocation, communal meetings, and segregated work details. This separation was designed 
to foster allegiance to the government in place of familial loyalty.77 By controlling contact between 
family members, the Khmer aimed to weaken family bonds, and replace them with a bond to the 
revolution.78 
Children who had been raised to respect their elders suddenly became equals to their parents and 
grandparents.79 Children were indoctrinated and told that they no longer needed to show deference to 
their elders; they were all “comrades” now.80 The Khmer pitted children against their parents and 
offered reasons why parents should be hated: parents stole from Angkar, were disloyal to the regime, 
and deserved to be punished.81 The cadres also expanded upon some cultural ideologies and traditions 
that were already a part of Cambodian heritage. For instance, the Communists glorified the concept of 
disproportionate revenge, which involves severe retaliation against enemies as to diminish their 
capability to cause harm or retaliate.82 
Cambodians are hailed as a people who never forget; most in the lower classes remembered the 
inferior status they endured and the plight of past generations as a result of the wealthier urbanites who 
were now ousted from their positions of power.83 Even in the next generation, people saw this new set of 
circumstances as an opportunity to avenge what they and their forefathers had struggled through.84 
There is also a “warrior heritage” in Cambodia that pre-existed the arrival of Buddhism.85 This is 
one of the few “national traditions” discussed in the DK Constitution.86 From a young age, children 
learned the merits of being a warrior, someone who distinguishes themselves through bravery, 
fulfilling their duty, and heroically fighting the enemy.87 Alexander Hinton, an Emery University 
anthropologist, suggests that “this type of ‘Cambodian machismo’ was premised upon an honor code 
that held those who dared to kill a sociopolitical enemy in battle gained face, while those who did not 
were shamed.”88 
D. SOCIAL CAMPAIGNS FOR GENOCIDE 
i. Dehumanization 
In Cambodia, the State established initiatives to stamp out individuality. The Khmer Rouge arsenal 
included two key weapons: 1) Exclusion, where a group of people lose their personal identity and are 
viewed in terms of a group by the larger society; and 2) Devaluation, whereby the society marginalizes the 
excluded group.89 Working and eating took place communally;90 everyone was required to cut their hair 
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short, wear identical black garbs, and speak as well as act in a manner deemed appropriate with a “proper 
revolutionary.”91 All of these radical adjustments were designed to drown out the individual and create a 
homogeneous mass.92 
Relocated from the cities or as rural refugees, New People were labeled “class enemies” because they 
were said to have supported Lon Nol, whom the Khmer Rouge ousted in a military coup.93 New People were 
treated as outsiders and subjected to dehumanizing practices.94 Forced into overcrowded trucks for 
relocation, they died of suffocation and were forced to defecate and urinate as they stood crammed next to 
one another for hours on end like cattle.95 
New People were treated as “war slaves.”96 Soldiers would often shout, “Prisoners of war! You are 
pigs. We have suffered much. Now you are our prisoners and you must suffer.”97 The Khmer Rouge was 
indoctrinated not to have feelings for the enemy; one cadre stated, “We were brainwashed to cut off our 
heart from the enemy, to be willing to kill those who had betrayed the revolution, even if the person was a 
parent, sibling, friend or relative. Everything we did was supposed to be for the [P]arty.”98 Public executions 
of anyone considered unreliable or to have links with the past government were common; torture centers 
were established where detailed records were kept.99 
To make their deaths viewed less critically, New People were dehumanized by the Khmer Rouge. One 
“outsider” recalls, “we were being treated worse than cattle, the victims of methodical, institutional 
contempt . . . we [were] no longer human beings.”100 A survivor of the genocide remembers, “[K]illing us 
was like swatting flies, a way to get rid of undesirables.”101 The Communists advocated that the educated 
people were undesirable because they posed the greatest threat to State power; the peasant class was 
brainwashed to believe the New People were not their countrymen and therefore inferior.102
ii. Acclimation to Killing and Denying Responsibility 
A notable initiative sponsored by the Khmer government was desensitization of the population to the 
prospect of killing. The “revolutionary spirit” was stressed at various propaganda meetings and ideological 
training sessions.103 Killing, it was explained, was a part of their civic duty and the more experience they got 
with it, the less it affected them.104 
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The people’s drive to comply with the directives they were issued and overlook the cruel, inhumane 
duties they were charged with, can further be attributed to the strong culture of obedience and the ingrained 
killing mechanism that the Khmer installed.105 Individuals felt forced to obey orders as a result of 
intimidation, criticism, and the threat of physical harm to them and their family.106 Through diligent training, 
which emphasized the necessity of killing and an obligation to follow instructions, as a means by which to 
also gain honor, a committed force of followers arose.107 Although some took solace in the thought of 
transferring blame for any wrongdoings they committed onto a higher up if they were ever questioned about 
their actions.108 
iii. Euphemisms 
In transforming directions to kill into medical jargon, which included such phrases as “cleansing” and 
extracting “diseased elements,” the order, and consequentially the act, became masked and appeared as 
something perhaps far removed from murder.109 In 1976, Pol Pot said, “There is a sickness in the Party . . . 
we cannot locate it precisely. The illness must emerge to be examined . . . if we wait any longer, the 
microbes can do real damage.”110 As historian Laurence Picq noted, “the race to eliminate this ‘infection’ 
led to increasingly violent purges both on the local level and within the upper echelons of the [P]arty 
itself.”111 A “pro-Vietnamese virus” that “infected” or “contaminated” many in the East Cambodia border 
region was cited as the rationale behind slaughtering a series of villages.112 In employing a tactic made 
famous in Nazi Germany, the Communists were able to convince the majority of their populace that there 
was an “infection” within them that needed to be “surgically removed” with all due force and haste.113 
iv. Moral Justification 
The Party convinced the rural, uneducated masses that the campaign they had embarked on was morally 
justified. For Comrade Chev and many like him in Cambodia at the time, killing “enemies” was a political 
necessity and a moral imperative: “If he purged enough enemies, he satisfied his conscience. He had done his 
duty to Angka.”114 Chev was taught that these New People were traitors: they stole food, attempted to escape, 
conspired against the State, and did not display “proper” revolutionary spirit.115 It was his duty to punish or 
execute them. Illustrated by the numerous references to blood in the national anthem, political speeches and 
revolutionary songs, violence against enemies was glorified by the Khmer Rouge regime.116 
A later justification for their actions came through retrospective analysis. The Khmer Rouge claimed 
that their revolutionaries had suffered far worse conditions than the “class enemies” of today, thereby 
negating the overwork, disease, starvation, living conditions, and executions newly-created societal enemies 
were enduring.117 Perhaps the most powerful means by which the State had to justify their actions came 
directly from those they persecuted. Through torture and forced confessions, their policies came to be 
defensible, for they had “proof” that there was in fact an enemy working against the People’s Party.118 
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E. COMPLACENCY OF THE UNITED STATES 
In her Pulitzer Prize winning work, A Problem from Hell, Samantha Power, who currently serves as 
President Obama’s Special Assistant on the National Security Council, stated: 
Neither President Ford nor President Carter, who took office in January 1977, was going to 
consider sending U.S. troops back to Southeast Asia. But it is still striking that so many 
Americans concluded that nothing at all could be done. Even the ‘soft’ response options that were 
available to the United States were passed up.”119 
President Ford, aware of the situation, initially denounced the Khmer Rouge’s actions; however 
after less than a month of rhetoric he became silent.120 There is no record of President Carter uttering a 
word about the massacres in Cambodia for the first two years of his presidency.121 In April, 1978, Carter 
makes his first public denouncement of the Khmer in a message to an independent Norwegian 
commission.122 He said: 
America cannot avoid the responsibility to speak out in condemnation of the Cambodian 
government, the worst violator of human rights in the world today. Thousands of refugees have 
accused their government of inflicting death on hundreds of thousands of Cambodian people 
through the genocidal policies it has implemented over the past three years. It is an obligation of 
every member of the international community to protest the policies of this or any nation which 
cruelly and systematically violates the right of its people to enjoy life and basic human 
dignities.123 
As Carter notes himself, America sat idly by for three years.124 In 1979, Carter’s National Security 
Advisor, Sbigniew Brzezinski, said “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an 
abomination. We could never support him, but China could.”125 The following year, Ray Cline, former 
Deputy Director of the CIA, visited a Khmer Rouge camp inside Cambodia as a senior foreign-policy 
adviser to then-President-elect Ronald Reagan. A Khmer Rouge press release reports that Cline “was 
warmly greeted by thousands of villagers.”126 
The United States supported the Khmer in an effort to exact revenge against Vietnam and to foster 
an alliance with China, an ancient foe of Vietnam.127 The U.S. encouraged Chinese arms shipments to 
the DK through Thailand and facilitated Khmer diplomats serving as representatives to the United 
Nations long after their government ceased to exist in January 1979.128 Richard Holbrooke, Former 
Secretary of State and the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated that the United States 
insisted on feeding the Khmer Rouge and through exerting influence on the World Food Program, over 
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$12 million in food was given to between 20,000 and 40,000 Khmer guerillas via the Thai Army in 
1980.129 
By November 1981, the CIA had fifty agents overseeing Washington’s Cambodian operations from 
Thailand according to Ray Cline, former Deputy Director of the CIA and a foreign policy advisor to 
President Reagan.130 The U.S. government made a cogent, proactive, and ultimately regretful decision to 
support a government it knew was abhorrent to further its foreign policy objectives. Having been 
embarrassed in Vietnam, a humbled American executive branch chose to enable murders so that it could 
obtain a degree of satisfaction in watching the struggles of a former adversary. 
IV. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
“When I came out, there were no birds,” said one survivor who had hidden throughout the 
genocide. “There was sunshine and the stench of death.” The sweetly sickening odor of 
decomposing bodies hung over many parts of Rwanda in July 1994: on Nyanza ridge, 
overlooking the capital, Kigali, where skulls and bones, torn clothing, and scraps of paper were 
scattered among the bushes; at Nyarubuye in eastern Rwanda, where the cadaver of a little girls, 
otherwise intact, had been flattened by passing vehicles to the thinness of cardboard in the front 
of the church steps; on the shores of idyllic Lake Rivu in western Rwanda, where pieces of 
human bodies had been thrown down the steep hillside; and at Nyakizu in southern Rwanda, 
where the sun bleached fragments of bone in the sand of the schoolyard and, on a nearby hill, a 
small red sweater held together the ribcage of a decapitated child.131 
In Rwanda, the conditions that led to genocide slowly developed over approximately a thirty-year span 
of time. Shortly after the Hutus gained control of the government through the nation’s first legislative 
elections in 1961, a period of neglect and state-sponsored subjugation of the minority Tutsi population 
began.132 By allowing criminal actions against this faction to go unchecked, even relished, a culture of 
disregard and disrespect for the Tutsis quickly escalated.133 When the small-scale and rather isolated 
butchery of the minority population went completely unimpeded and uncensored by the authorities, the 
proverbial ball was already well on its way, rolling toward its eventual objective of genocide.134 
A. ORGANIZATION 
The Hutu government progressed by exaggerating conditions and circumstances that were already in place. 
Shortly after Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, official orders came 
down from interim government spokespersons, including the Municipal Judge of Kibungo, for the general 
population to kill the Tutsi.135 Within thirteen weeks after President Habyarimana’s death, at least half a million 
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people were killed, including as many as three-quarters of the Tutsi population.136 Simultaneously, thousands of 
Hutus were killed because they opposed the campaign of annihilation against their Tutsi neighbors.137 Authorities 
organized and conducted daily assemblies of their loyal Hutu forces, giving instructions for the day’s 
activities.138 They would arrange patrols, settle disputes over loot, and lay out objectives for their manhunts.139 In 
the early days of the killing, government officials distributed the names, addresses and in some instances license 
plate numbers of high-priority targets that needed to be “dispatched.”140 
Reports and minutes were taken daily at local-level meetings and then distributed up the chain of 
command through administrative channels.141 Interim President Sindikubwabo identified his 
government as “a government of saviors” that would come directly to the people “to tell you what it 
expects of you.”142 Ministers and other high-ranking officials went to the countryside, giving rousing 
speeches and insisting on support for the genocide, promising rewards for supporters and threatening 
opponents.143 Without this organization from the top, some argue that the farmers and laymen who 
actually did all of the killing would be unsure of what to do and eventually go home to their fields.144 
B. THE ROLE OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS 
In Nazi Germany, only a few months prior to Kristallnacht, in July 1938, the “J-stamp” was introduced 
on national ID cards and later on passports.145 Ethnic classification on ID cards was first instituted in 
Rwanda by the Belgian colonial government in 1933 and was retained after independence.146 Prior to 
independence, nine Hutu leaders declared their intention to retain the classification cards in what has been 
dubbed the “Hutu Manifesto” on March 24, 1957.147 They wrote, “We are opposed vigorously, at least for 
the moment, to the suppression in the official or private identity papers of the mentions ‘muhutu’ [or] 
‘mututsi’[emphasis added].”148 Of the nine authors of this document, Gregoire Kayibanda became Rwanda’s 
first president in 1961 and Juvenal Habyarimana succeeded him in 1973— both retained the ethnic group 
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affiliation display on ID cards.149 In November 1990, Habyarimana announced his intention to abolish the 
ethnicity display, but the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, Robert A. Flaten encouraged him to retain them.150 
In “shaping, defining and perpetuating ethnic identity,” ID cards with the designation “Tutsi” was a 
marking of death once the 1994 genocide began; the identification cards were a great facilitator of 
genocide:151 
Soldiers had orders to take identity cards from those whom they killed. According to one witness, 
[Captain Ildephonse] Nizeyimana regularly received these cards from his men as they reported on 
the progress of the killings. They often appeared at his house shortly after a volley of gunfire was 
heard and handed the cards to the captain with the report, “Mission accomplished.” In the 
captain’s absence, his wife received the cards.152 
In addition to facilitating the location of Tutsis with greater ease, the ID cards created a psychological 
distance between victims and killers thus making the nature of the killers’ tasks easier.153 While the majority 
of countries around the world issue national identification cards to all adults over the age of 15, the U.S., 
Britain, Canada, and Australia have not pursued plans to adopt such measures after heated debates about 
government control and privacy issues.154 
C. MOTIVATION TO KILL 
Those who showed bravery in the field or who happened to possess the most adept weaponry for 
killing were appointed to leadership positions.155 Only through success in achieving the ultimate objective of 
killing the most Tutsis as possible could one hope to attain respect and upward mobility in this system.156 
There were tangible incentives for those who participated.157 Food, alcohol, military uniforms, and cash 
were very powerful enticements for the impoverished and hungry.158 Many were told if they did not take 
Tutsi’s property they would lose their own.159 
Through exerting influence from the top and using the financial benefits of looting as leverage, the 
Rwandan government was successfully able to use their station of power to nurture and later command a 
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genocidal force composed of the general population.160 Like the organizers, “the killers who executed the 
genocide were not demons nor [sic] responding to ineluctable forces. They were people who chose to do evil. 
Tens of thousands, swayed by fear, hatred, or hope of profit, made the choice quickly and easily,” though 
hundreds and thousands of others chose to participate under duress or fear for their own lives.161 The culture of 
fear that existed in Rwanda has been characterized as a “systematic, centralized, and unconditional.”162 
D. PROPAGANDA 
In supporting public speeches and demonstrations against the Tutsis, coupled with denouncements 
from the mainstream media, the Hutu populace was showered with propaganda from all sides condoning the 
suppression of their neighbors.163 The Hutus were also instructed via political meetings and the radio to 
cease sharing land and cooperating in farm related tasks with Tutsis.164 Hutus were told not to intermarry 
with the Tutsi because it would pose conflicts when it was time to kill them off in the future.165 
The Nazi’s had a similar outlook in the years leading up to the Holocaust. Declared at the annual Nazi 
rally in Nuremberg in 1935 and approved on September 15th of that year, Gesetz zum Schutze des Deutschen 
Blutes un der Duetschen Ehre (“Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor”) forbade 
marriage and sexual relations between Jews and those of German blood.166 This law, coupled with 
Reichsburgergesetz (“Law of the Reich Citizen”), which was designed to deprive Jews of German 
citizenship, were two of the early Third Reich race laws.167 These laws are substantively similar to those 
edicts issued by the Hutu in Rwanda in the years prior to genocide.168 
“With a high illiteracy rate and many people living in rural areas, where movement is greatly restricted, 
tight government control of the airwaves enabled the Rwandan authorities to suppress crucial information 
about the war and the killing of Tutsi civilians.”169 Propagandists created events to deceive the public into 
believing the necessity of force.170 The “attack” on Kigali on October 4, 1990171 and the foiled plot to 
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murder Hutu leaders in Bugesera in March 1992, were “created” events by State-run Radio Rwanda, like 
many others in the years before the outbreak of genocide to spread hatred for Tutsis.172 Throughout the 
genocide, Radio Rwanda and Radio-Television Libre des Millnes Collines (RTLM)173 instigated slaughter 
and gave specific directions on how to carry out their orders.174 On April 12, 1994, this message came across 
the Radio Rwanda airwaves: 
We ask that people do patrols, as they are doing, in their neighborhoods. They must close the 
ranks, remember how to use their usual tools [i.e., weapons] and defend themselves . . . I would 
ask that each neighborhood try to organize itself to do communal work to clear the brush, to 
search houses, beginning with those that are abandoned, to search to marshes of the area to be 
sure that no inyenzi have slipped in to hide themselves there . . . so they should cut this brush, 
search the drains and ditches . . . put up barriers and guard them, choosing reliable people to do 
this, who have what they need . . . so that nothing can escape.175 
RTLM broadcasted this advisory directed to listeners in the Rubungo commune: 
Courage! Don’t wait for the armed forces to intervene. Act fast and don’t allow these enemies to 
continue their advance! If you wait for the authorities, that’s your problem. They are not the ones 
who are going to look out for your houses during the night! You must defend yourselves.176 
Many newspapers and journals, most notably Kangura, were instrumental in targeting and gaining the 
support or at the very least, complacency of educated officials and businessmen for the genocide.177 
E. SOCIAL CAMPAIGNS FOR GENOCIDE 
i. Moral Justification 
Playing off of the ethnic strife that was developing even before Rwanda’s independence in 1962, the 
Communist government sought to foster an “us versus them” perspective.178 If a Hutu did not go along with 
the system underway, they too risked being killed. If a Hutu resisted the call to arms against the Tutsi, those 
close to them would be in danger.179 Some citizens believe that their government, a “moral authority,” gave 
them legitimate orders that absolved them of the evil they were committing.180 
                                                 
172 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 66; See generally BROADCASTING, supra note 164, at 25-28. 
173 BROADCASTING, supra note 164, at 109, 120-32 (explain that the RTML reached its height during the genocide and 
broadcasted twenty-four hours a day for the first several weeks after the President’s plane crash and then on a more limited 
schedule thereafter. The RTML was also instrumental in tracking down influential Tutsis who were trying to escape the county 
and identifying potential hiding places used by Tutsis). 
174 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 248; BROADCASTING, supra note 164, at 84-97. 
175 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 249. 
176 Id. at 251, 316 (stating “the importance of RTLM was underscored by a group of men from the Nyarwungo sector, Musebeya, 
who stated that from the time of the plane crash, they started listening to the radio. Those who had no radios visited neighbors 
who had them so that they could know what might be coming next. The genocide, they said, was a concept they understood 
from the radio, not having known before what it meant.”). 
177 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 66; See BROADCASTING, supra note 164, at 35, 62-70 (saying that Kangura was the first and 
most notorious newspaper to publish systematic and abusive material about the Tutsis. Kangura was also responsible for the 
well-known “10 Hutu Commandments.” In issue number 7 in December 1990, the paper published a list of forty-one Tutsi 
merchants in Kigali, claiming the list came directly from the authorities and that these were the names of traitors). 
178 MIRONKO, supra note 157, at 168. 
179 Id.; DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 12; See generally RICHARD ORTH, RWANDA’S HUTU EXTREMIST INSURGENCY: AN 
EYEWITNESS PERSPECTIVE in GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW PERSPECTIVES, at 215 (Susan E. Cook ed. 2006). 
180 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 12; ORTH, supra note 179, at 220. 
192 THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW 
 
Community leaders and clergy members told the masses that they were justified in their actions.181 In 
their meetings, local leaders called for “self-defense” against “accomplices.”182 Platforms of political parties 
had included killing off the Tutsis since 1992.183 In his November 1992 speech, one candidate insisted that 
the Tutsis leave while they still could.184 He said: 
The time has come for us also to defend ourselves. Why do we not arrest these parents who have 
sent their children away and who do we not exterminate them? I would like to tell you that we are 
now asking for those people to be put on a list and for them to be brought to court so that they can 
be judged before us. If they [the judges] refuse . . . we should do it ourselves by exterminating 
this scum.185 
When confronted with reports of the first killings, authorities simply denied them.186 As a result of the 
inaccessible location of many of the massacres this seemed to be an easy solution.187 When a massacre could 
not be covered up, authorities declared the Tutsis had brought it upon themselves by declaring an unjust war 
and by attacking Hutus.188 
ii. Acclimation to Killing and Denying Responsibility 
In creating genocide, Hutu officeholders gradually developed an atmosphere of disregard and hostility 
for the minority Tutsi population.189 By first allowing for crime against Tutsis to go unpunished and then 
encouraging the public to rally behind their extermination—which ultimately led to the approval of violent 
rampages— Hutu politicians set the stage for the Tutsis demise.190 They slowly added fuel to the fire until 
the circumstances compounded enough for a total war against this ethnic group to develop. 
A prime factor leading to the genocide in Rwanda was provided by the population’s numbness to death 
as a result of war.191 Jean Hatzfeld, a war correspondent for the French newspaper Libération and author of 
the book Machete Season states that “all genocides in modern history have occurred in the midst of war . . . 
it systematizes death, normalizes savagery, fosters fear and delusions . . . and unsettles morality and human 
values.”192 War appears to undermine the ethical integrity of a society as well as its populace at an individual 
basis, enabling such ideas as mass-murder to appear sane if not ethical.193 Lubrication of the value system 
was further aided by the vast role of alcoholism in the Hutu ranks.194 
Constant inebriation dulled the murderer’s senses making their tasks easier to accomplish. Even so, 
over time, the duties they performed became habitual and routine, even mundane.195 Killing, while at first 
shocking and emotionally charged, slowly developed into a daily activity, seen as a societal necessity. 
Survivors and witnesses speak of the killers approach as if they were “government workers putting in a day 
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at the office . . . killers quit at day’s end, go home and feast on food and drink they had pillaged or been 
given, ready to come back the next morning, rested and fit for ‘work.’”196 
iii. Euphemisms 
Shortly after the President’s plane crash, voices on the radio began calling for the extermination of 
these “cockroaches” from their midst.197 Killing was known as “work” and machetes and guns were called 
“tools.”198 As hunting was common in this mostly rural nation, the use of hunting metaphors during the 
genocide was common.199 Hutu “hunters” were not ordered to kill Tutsis, but rather told, “Let no snake 
escape you.”200 Hutu’s often used hunting dogs to track down Tutsi and flush them out of the bushes they 
may have hidden in.201 Ibirtero— machetes, spears and clubs— the weapons used to kill Tutsis were the 
same as if they were killing a common animal.202 
F. WAS IT INEVITABLE? THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ ROLE IN RWANDA 
In the words of one expert, “This [Rwanda] was the most easily preventable genocide imaginable.”203 If 
there is anything worse than genocide it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen; the Rwandan genocide 
was not inevitable. In a 1998 report to The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Col. Scott Feil 
of the U.S. Army concluded that a force of merely 5,000 well-equipped and trained men inserted into Rwanda 
between April 7 and 21, 1994 could have prevented genocide.204 UN Assistance to Rwanda (“UNAMIR”) 
Commander General Romeo Dalaire stated, “The killings could have easily been prevented if there had been the 
international will to accept the costs of doing so . . .”205 Dalaire’s statement begs the question, what is the cost of 
human life and why was the international community, namely the United States, unwilling to commit? 
In 1998, President Clinton apologized to the Rwandan people for the “ignorance” of the United States 
in not intervening, however scholars insist that the fear of domestic political backlash was the rationale for 
not acting.206 President Clinton stated: 
During the 90 days that began on April 6 in 1994, Rwanda experienced the most intensive 
slaughter in this blood-filled century we are about to leave . . . as you know better than me, [this] 
took at least a million lives. Scholars of these sorts of events say that the killers, armed mostly 
with machetes and clubs, nonetheless did their work five times as fast as the mechanized gas 
chambers used by the Nazis.207 
The politics of the United States were simple enough. In October 1993, the U.S. had lost eighteen 
Army Rangers in Somalia and it would have been politically difficult at home to engage in another 
peacekeeping mission so soon.208 The U.S. made a conscious decision. 
                                                 
196 Id. 
197 MIRKANKO, supra note 157, at 182. 
198 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 8 (suggesting that killing of Tutsis was called environmental culling or sanitation). 
199 MIRKANKO, supra note 157, at 182. 
200 Id. at 182-83. 
201 Id.; DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 10; Barnett, supra note 195, at 578. 
202 MIRKANKO, supra note 157, at 182. 
203 HOWARD ADELMAN, GENOCIDISTS AND SAVIORS IN RWANDA 4 (1999). 
204 Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (Washington D.C.: Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). 
205 Romeo Dalaire & Bruce Poulin, Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide, 24 CAN. DEFENSE Q. 3 (1995). 
206 Richard N. Haas, The Squandered Presidency: Demanding more from the Commander-in-Chief, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 3 (2000). 
207 President Bill Clinton, Address to the Rwandan People at Kigali International Airport (March 25, 1998), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-5798.html. 
208 DES FORGES, supra note 131, at 176 (stating that the U.S. was not ignorant, but rather no stake in Rwanda, no interests to 
guard, and there were “political interests at home to cater to”). 
194 THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW 
 
While many might accept the reluctance of Americans to come to Rwanda’s aid, it is quite another 
thing to prevent others. A full two weeks into the genocide, the United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Madeleine Albright, was the most vocal advocate of removing all but a skeletal UN team from 
Rwanda.209 She said that the United States “adamantly refused to accept publicly that a full-fledged, 
Convention-defined genocide was in fact taking place”—an already depleted UNAMIR force was then 
reduced to 270 men.210 As Tony Marley, a Political Military Advisor for the U.S. State Department from 
1992-95 and a Clinton Administration insider, explained, “If we acknowledge it was genocide, that 
mandated by international law that the US had to do something . . . If we acknowledged it was genocide and 
didn’t do anything . . . what [would be] the impact on U.S. foreign policy relations with the rest of the world 
following inaction after admitting it’s genocide . . .”211 
Just as was the case in Cambodia, the U.S. Government chose to ignore its moral obligation to save 
lives it knew were in serious jeopardy. While the United States did not covertly aid the genocidal force in 
Rwanda, as it did in Cambodia, it used its political might to thwart the efforts of the other, more 
conscientious, nations to come to the aid of the innocent Rwandans in danger through its clout in the United 
Nations. This course of action is perhaps more objectionable than directly aiding in the massacres. 
V. WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES STAND FOR? 
[Rwanda] sits as the greatest regret I have from the time I was U.N. ambassador and maybe even as 
[S]ecretary of [S]tate, because it is a huge tragedy, and something that sits very heavy on all our souls, I think. 
- Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, February 25, 2004212 
You look at something like Darfur, and it just breaks your heart. 
- Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, September 20, 2008213 
[O]one of the real regrets I’ve had is that we haven’t been able to do something about Sudan. 
- Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, November 13, 2008214 
Is there a reason why apologizing for inaction in genocide has become so common among outgoing 
U.S. Secretaries of State? Will Secretary Clinton be apologizing for a new travesty in January 2013 or will 
the nation have to wait until 2016? It is time to evaluate the United States’ policy on intervening upon the 
observation of pre-genocide symptoms. 
After examining the U.S. role in Cambodia and Rwanda, one is confronted with a very self-serving, 
underhanded, and deceitful view of American foreign policy. The American Government was fully aware of 
the genocidal campaigns underway in both nations and had an opportunity to do something, anything, to 
assist, and yet it did nothing. In the case of Cambodia, the U.S. covertly aided the Khmer regime while it 
was in power and continued to do so after its heinous deeds were well-known. Though supporting arms and 
food shipments to the Khmer Rouge as well as providing tactical support through a well-manned CIA 
mission in neighboring Thailand, the United States’ stance in this matter is unmistakable. In Rwanda, the 
U.S. used its political might as a U.N. Security Council member to prevent peacekeeping troops from 
coming to the aid of a desperate Tutsi population. 
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While one can rationalize, even appreciate, the U.S. desire to keep American boots off the ground in 
Cambodia following the war in Vietnam and conflicts in both Rwanda and Somalia, it would have been 
better had they done nothing at all. Unfortunately, the U.S. acted out of vengeance, distain, and perhaps even 
fear when confronted with these situations. Ignoring grave human rights violations, the American 
government knowingly funded a regime that was annihilating its own population in hopes of irritating the 
Vietnamese. When dealing with Rwanda, the Government showed its true colors in hiding behind the 
legalese of international human rights treaties so as to avoid confrontation. By refusing to provide a name to 
the horrific actions that were taking place in Africa, perhaps the U.S. thought their problem would go away. 
It did not. 
The U.S. has not done enough when faced with genocide. Undoubtedly, when confronted with 
devastating reports of mass murder, many considerations need to be taken into effect. However, the 
Government would have increasingly more flexibility in its response if it were to recognize genocide before 
it takes place. By taking notice of methods discussed, U.S. foreign services, clandestine agencies, aid 
workers, and Armed Forces can put their government in a position to react to a fluid situation before it is too 
late. The U.S. must keep vigilant, expanding its surveillance and physical presence in regions of the world 
that are war-torn, impoverished, and historically rich with ethnic strife. 
When a new constitution is adopted that calls into question the citizenship large segments of a nation’s 
population, the U.S. should be ready to react. When a politician who vows to annihilate an ethnic minority is 
elected to office, the U.S. should be ready to react. When the doors on every library, hospital, place of 
worship, and law office are shuttered in unison, the U.S. should be ready to react. Through advanced 
recognition and the diligent pursuit of the truth, the United States may act before there is bloodshed, thereby 
saving itself infinite resources and protecting the lives of countless innocents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 2000, the leading Republican presidential candidate was asked by a television interviewer what 
he would do as President “if God forbid, another Rwanda should take place.” George W. Bush 
replied, “We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide outside our 
strategic interest. I would not send the United States troops into Rwanda.”215 
How many times can the United States sit on the sidelines and say “never again” as if it was a catch 
phrase from a timeless movie? Where do our interests truly lie? We must learn from the past and have the 
fortitude and forthrightness to stand up for what is right, even if it may initially be unpopular in some circles. 
Instead of focusing our efforts commemorating genocide victims or punishing the perpetrators as it did in 
Cambodia and Rwanda, the U.S. needs to act proactively and look for the early warning signs discussed, 
particularly in poverty-stricken and war-torn areas.216 By rejecting and condemning policies that make 
genocide more likely, the United States of America will ensure its status as a moral beacon in the 
international community, save the lives of more innocent non-combatants, and protect its own national 
security. 
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